In Team Semantics, a dependency notion is strongly first order if every sentence of the logic obtained by adding the corresponding atoms to First Order Logic is equivalent to some first order sentence. In this work it is shown that all nontrivial dependency atoms that are strongly first order, downwards closed, and relativizable (in the sense that the relativizations of the corresponding atoms with respect to some unary predicate are expressible in terms of them) are definable in terms of constancy atoms.
Introduction
Team Semantics [26] generalizes Tarski's semantics for First Order Logic by allowing formulas to be satisfied or not satisfied by sets of assignments, called teams, rather than by single assignments. Team Semantics was originally developed in order to provide a compositional semantics equivalent to the imperfectinformation, game-theoretic semantics of Independence-Friendly Logic [24, 23, 35] ; however, with the work of Väänänen [36] it became clear that this semantics is a natural generalization of Tarski's semantics, one which -even putting aside its connections with the theory of databases (see for instance [28] ) -greatly extends its expressive capabilities by allowing the study of a far greater range of atoms and operators.
One of the most peculiar aspects of Team Semantics is the way in which it straddles the boundary between first order and second order: while the syntaxes of the logics based on Team Semantics studied so far have for the most part a solidly first order flavour, in the sense that they involve no explicit higher order quantification 1 , their expressive power often rises well above the one of First Order Logic, all the way up to Existential Second Order Logic (as in the cases of Dependence Logic [36] and Independence Logic [20] ) or even to full Second Order Logic (as in the case of Team Logic [37, 29] ). This is the case even for logics, such as the above mentioned Dependence Logic and Independence Logic or for Inclusion Logic [13] , which only add to the language of First Order Logic dependency atoms whose satisfaction conditions are first order definable as properties of relations. In brief, this is due to the higher order quantification hidden in Team Semantics rules for disjunction and existential quantification (see Rules TS-∨ and TS-∃ of Definition 2.6). For First Order Logic proper there exists a strict equivalence between Team Semantics and Tarski's usual semantics on the level of sentences (see Proposition 2.8), but this equivalence fails badly on the level of formulas: there exist properties of relations that are first order definable (in the sense that they are defined by a first order sentence φ(R)), but that do not correspond to the satisfaction conditions of any first order formula in Team Semantics (that is, there is no first order formula ψ(x) which is satisfied by a set of assignments X if and only if the corresponding relation satisfies φ(R)). Adding new atoms with these (first order definable) satisfaction conditions, therefore, will increase the expressive power of the logic, in the sense that there will be formulas of this new logic which are not equivalent to any first order formula.
Does it follow that this new logic will be more expressive also with respect to sentences, in the sense that there will exist sentences of this new logic which are not equivalent to any first order sentence? Not necessarily. While this is true for e.g. Dependence Logic and Independence Logic (that is, for the logics obtained by adding the functional dependence atoms or the independence atoms of Definition 2.11 respectively), it is possible to find dependencies for which this is not the case: while adding them to the language of First Order Logic makes it more expressive with respect to formulas, every sentence of this new logic is still equivalent to some first order sentence. Dependency atoms, or families of dependency atoms, for which this is the case are called strongly first order [15, 16] .
This asymmetry between expressivity on the level of formulas and expressivity on the level of sentences is one of the most intriguing aspects of Team Semantics; and, in particular, the fact that when using Team Semantics it is possible to generate logics with expressive powers between that of First Order Logic FO and that of Existential Second Order Logic ESO (included) simply by adding to FO atoms with first order definable satisfaction conditions makes Team Semantics an eminently suitable tool for the study and classification of fragments of ESO, a topic rich with open questions and with deep connections with important complexity-theoretic conjectures.
The study of strongly first order dependencies, in particular, can be thought of as an attempt to investigate the border between first order and second order "from below" by seeking to characterize precisely which choices of dependency atoms (or families of dependency atoms) breach or fail to breach it. The conjecture according to which a dependency is strongly first order if and only if it is definable in terms of upwards closed dependencies and constancy dependencies 2 is, however, still unproven. In this work, a proof for a special case of it will be found: if a non-trivially-false dependency is strongly first order, is downwards closed, and is furthermore relativizable (a new, natural property of dependencies which will be introduced in this work) then it is definable in terms of constancy atoms alone.
A property related to strong first orderness and introduced in the recent [17] is safety. In brief, a dependency (or a set of dependencies) is safe for some logic if it can be added to it without increasing the expressive power (wrt sentences) of the resulting formalism. In particular, a dependency is strongly first order if and only if it is safe for First Order Logic. This notion of safety, thus, generalizes the notion of strong first orderness to logics more expressive than pure First Order Logic, and a complete characterization of safety would provide a full classification of the expressive powers of the logics obtained by adding dependencies to logics with Team Semantics. Safety, however, is a surprisingly delicate notion: for instance, as shown in [17] , constancy -despite being perhaps the simplest example of strongly first order dependency -is not safe for First Order Logic plus certain classes of dependencies (e.g. unary inclusion dependencies). In this work it will be shown that, in the case of downwards closed dependencies, safety is more robust: any strongly first order dependency is safe for First Order Logic plus any family containing only downwards closed dependencies. This result, aside from being interesting in its own right, will be essential for the characterization of strongly first order downwards closed relativizable dependencies mentioned above.
Much of the research in the area of Team Semantics thus far has focused on the study of specific logics obtained by adding specific atoms (or specific operators) to First Order Logic with Team Semantics. This is an important direction of research, and many of the resulting logics are of independent interest (and, often, have intriguing connections with the theory of databases). But an equivalently important, if so far understandably 3 less studied, one consists in the classification of general families of such logics in terms of their relationships and of their meta-logical properties. The study of strongly first order and safe dependencies, to which this paper contributes, is a promising subtopic of this intriguing and largely unexplored field of research.
Preliminaries

Team Semantics and Dependencies
As mentioned in the Introduction, Team Semantics generalizes Tarski's semantics for First Order Logic by letting formulas be satisfied or not satisfied by sets of assignments, which are called teams for historical reasons: Definition 2.1 (Team). Let M be a first order model (over any signature Σ) with domain M and let V be a finite set of variables. Then a team X over M with domain Dom(X) = V is a set of variable assignments s : V → M over M.
There exists an obvious correspondence between teams and relations: Definition 2.2 (Teams to Relations). Let X be a team over some model M, and let v = v 1 . . . v n be a finite tuple of (not necessarily pairwise distinct) variables such that v i ∈ Dom(X) for all i = 1 . . . n. Then we write X(v) for the n-ary relation
Teams can be restricted to a subset of the variables in their domain in the obvious way: Definition 2.3 (Team Restriction). Let X be a team over some model M and let V ⊆ Dom(X) be a subset of the variables in its domain. Then we write X |V for the restriction of X to the variables in V , that is for
where, for all assignments s ∈ X, s |V is the unique assignment with domain V such that s |V (v) = s(v) for all variables v ∈ V .
It will also be useful, in several places of this work, to consider the subteam of a given team which contains only the assignments satisfying (in the sense of the usual Tarskian Semantics) some first order formula θ. This is defined in the obvious way: Definition 2.4 (Team Selection). Let X be a team over some model M and let θ(x) be a first order formula over the signature of M whose free variables Free(θ) are contained in the domain Dom(X) of X. Then
where the expression M |= s θ(x) means that the assignment s satisfies θ(x) in M according to the usual Tarskian Semantics.
Finally, in order to define Team Semantics we will also need the two following operations: For every m ∈ M k , we also write X[m/v] for the set {s[m/v] : s ∈ X}, that is for the supplementation of X along v via some H with H(s) = {m} for all s ∈ X.
Finally, we write X[M/v] for the largest possible supplementation of X, which is also called the duplication of X and which extends X by assigning all possible values to the variables in v:
The reason why the above supplementation operation is described as "lax" is because there also exists in the literature a "strict" version, in which H(s) is a singleton for every s ∈ X. As discussed in [13] , the choice between these two operations (as well as between two possible semantics for disjunction) corresponds precisely to the choice between allowing or disallowing nondeterministic strategies in the equivalent imperfect-information game-theoretic semantics; however, when considering non downwards-closed dependencies, the strict variant of the Team Semantics can fail to satisfy locality (Proposition 2.13 in this work) in the sense that the satisfiability of a formula φ in a team X may depend on the values taken in X by variables which do not appear free in φ. Because of this, in this work (as in most of the recent literature in the area of Team Semantics) we will focus only on the lax version of the semantics. Definition 2.6 ((Lax) Team Semantics for First Order Logic). Let M be a first order model, let X be a team over it, and let φ(x) be a first order formula in Negation Normal Form 4 over the signature of M such that the free variables of φ are contained in the domain of X. Then we say that X satisfies φ in M, and write M |= X φ, if and only if this follows from the following rules:
TS-lit If α is a first order literal then M |= X α if and only if, for all s ∈ X, M |= s α according to the usual rules of Tarskian Semantics;
TS-∨ For all formulas ψ 1 and ψ 2 , M |= X ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 if and only if there exist
TS-∧ For all formulas ψ 1 and ψ 2 , M |= X ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 if and only if M |= X ψ 1 and M |= X ψ 2 ;
TS-∃ For all formulas ψ and all variables v, M |= X ∃vψ if and only if there exists some H :
TS-∀ For all formulas ψ and all variables v, M |= X ∀vψ if and only if
Given a first order model M and a negation normal form, first order sentence φ over its signature, we say that φ is true in M in Team Semantics, and write M |= φ, if and only if M |= {ǫ} φ, where {ǫ} is the team containing the unique assignment ǫ over the empty domain. 4 It is possible to define Team Semantics for expressions not in Negation Normal Form, as it was done for instance in [36] . However, doing so requires taking track of positive and negative satisfaction conditions, which makes the semantics more cumbersome; and, as discussed in [31] , the usual ("dual") negation operator has little semantic meaning in certain Team Semanticsbased extensions of First Order Logic, as the satisfaction conditions of a formula and of its negation are essentially unrelated. Furthermore, it is often unclear what the interpretation of the dual negation of a dependency atom should be: for instance, in [36] it was decided that the negations of functional dependence atoms =(x; y) are only satisfied by empty teams, that is they are all equivalent to ⊥. For this reason, in this work we will assume that all expressions are in Negation Normal Form. Another possible negation operator, of clearer interpretation in Team Semantics, is the contradictory negation M |= X ∼ φ ⇔ M |= X φ; but adding it to First Order Logic together with even very simple dependencies (e.g. constancy atoms) brings the expressive power of the resulting formalism all the way up to Second Order Logic. The logic FO(∼) obtained by taking First Order Logic (with Team Semantics) and adding to it the contradictory negation (but no dependencies) is however equivalent to First Order Logic wrt sentences, as shown in [16] , and in [34] an axiomatization for it is found. This operator will not be further discussed in this work. 5 In this rule we do not require that Y ∩Z = ∅. Doing that would give us the strict semantics for disjunction, which -as in the case of supplementation and existential quantificationcorresponds to allowing only deterministic strategies in the game theoretic semantics and would result in the failure of Proposition 2.13 for certain non-downwards closed dependencies.
The following two widely known facts describe completely the relationship between Team Semantics and Tarskian Semantics for First Order Logic: Proposition 2.7. Let M be a first order model, let X be a team over it, and let φ(x) ∈ FO be a first order formula over the signature of M and with free variables in Dom(X). Then M |= X φ(x) if and only if, for all assignments s ∈ X, M |= s φ according to the usual Tarskian Semantics.
Proof. Straightforward induction. Proof. Suppose that such a φ(x) exists. Let M be a model containing two elements 0 and 1, and let s 0 = (x : 0) and s 1 = (x : 1) be two assignments with domain {x} assigning the values 0 and 1 respectively to the variable x. Then M |= {s0} φ(x) and M |= {s1} φ(x); and therefore, by Proposition 2.7, M |= s0 φ(x) and M |= s1 φ(x) in the sense of Tarski's Semantics. But then, again by Proposition 2.7, for X = {s 0 , s 1 } we have that M |= X φ(x). This contradicts our assumption, because |X(x)| = |{0, 1}| = 2 > 1.
Thus, it is possible to extend the Team Semantics of First Order Logic by introducing new types of atoms, such as the following constancy atoms: 6 Here we write M[X(t)/R] for the first order model obtained by adding the relation symbol R to M -if it is not present already -and fixing the relation X(t) = {s(t) : s ∈ X} as its interpretation. It is then possible to inquire about the properties of this Constancy Logic. For example, by Corollary 2.9 we know already that there exist formulas in constancy logic which are not equivalent to any first order formula; but what about sentences? Can Constancy Logic be used to define classes of models which are not definable in First Order Logic? As shown in [13] , the answer is no. However, this is the case for the following atoms and for the logics that they characterize: Definition 2.11 (Functional Dependence, Independence, and Inclusion). Dependence Logic, Independence Logic, and Inclusion Logic are the logics obtained by adding to the language of First Order Logic functional dependence atoms = (x; y), independence atoms x⊥ y z, and inclusion atoms x ⊆ y respectively, with the following semantics:
TS-indep M |= X x⊥ y z iff for any two s, s ′ ∈ X with s(y) = s ′ (y) there exists some s ′′ ∈ X such that s ′′ (xy) = s(xy) and s ′′ (yz) = s ′ (yz);
TS-inc M |= X x ⊆ y iff for any s ∈ X there exists some s ′ ∈ X such that s(x) = s ′ (y).
As shown in [36] , [20] and [19] respectively, Dependence Logic and Independence Logic are equivalent to Existential Second Order Logic ESO over sentences, while Inclusion Logic is equivalent to the positive fragment of Greatest Fixed Point Logic 7 . This is the case despite the fact that the satisfaction conditions of the above atoms are easily definable as first order properties of relations; and, as mentioned in the Introduction, the fact that Team Semantics allows to greatly increase the expressive power of First Order Logic via first order definable properties is precisely what makes it an eminently suitable tool for the study of the boundary between first order and higher order logics. Additionally, it is worth remarking here that these dependencies have clear connections with database theory: the relationship between functional dependence and inclusion atoms and the functional [6, 1] and inclusion [3] dependencies of database theory is obvious, and as discussed in [10] there likewise exists a correspondence between independence atoms and database-theoretic multivalued dependencies [12] . Additionally, these atoms have a strong doxastic flavour: if a team X represents the set of the states of things that an agent believes possible then =(x, y) can be read as "if I learned the true value of x, I could infer the value of y", while x⊥ y z can be read as "if I learned the true value of y, the value of x would give me no information whatsoever regarding the value of z" and x ⊆ y can be read as "every possible value for x is also a possible value for y". As discussed in [14] , all the connectives and operators of Team Semantics also admit natural interpretations in terms of the dynamics of belief states; but we will not pursue this line of thought any further in this work.
A very fruitful research direction in Team Semantics research so far has consisted in the study of the properties of these logics and of fragments thereof (see e.g. [27, 8, 13, 19, 18, 32, 21, 22, 9] ). This is a valuable topic of investigation, with rich connections with open problems in the classification of better known fragments of Second Order Logic and in descriptive complexity theory. Furthermore, as briefly mentioned above, these logics are of independent interest, and hence their properties and those of their fragments are deserving of study for their own sake.
The present work is a contribution to a different -if obviously related -research programme, one in which the central topic of investigation is not Dependence Logic or Independence Logic or any other specific Team Semantics-based logic per se but rather Team Semantics itself ; and, under this perspective, rather than selecting "interesting" additional atoms and studying the logics obtained by adding them to First Order Logic we want to select "interesting" properties for Team Semantics-based logics and investigate which atoms (or more in general which operators, although as we will see there are plenty of open questions even in the more limited case of atoms) or collections of atoms satisfy them if added to the language of First Order Logic.
In order to do this properly, we must first clarify exactly what a dependency atom is in Team Semantics. The following definition, from [33] , is a natural starting point: Definition 2.12 (Dependency). For any k ∈ N, a k-ary dependency D is a class of models over the signature {R} which is closed under isomorphisms, where R is a k-ary relation symbol. The following result shows that, no matter the choice of D, FO(D) is local in the sense that the values of variables which do not appear free in a formula are irrelevant to its satisfaction or lack thereof: Proposition 2.13 (Locality). Let D be any family of dependencies, let φ be a formula of FO(D), and let Free(φ) be the set of its free variables. Then, for all models M whose signature contains that of φ and for all teams X with domain containing Free(φ),
Proof. Straightforward induction.
It is easy to verify that all the dependency atoms discussed so far are special cases of Definition 2.12. Note, furthermore, that nothing in Definition 2.12 requires the class D to be first order definable. For instance, U = { M, R : |R| is uncountable} 9 is a perfectly acceptable unary dependency, and the corresponding satisfaction condition in Team Semantics is: M |= X Ut if and only if X(t) is uncountable.
If, as in the case of U, the satisfaction conditions of a dependency atom D are not first order definable then obviously not all sentences of FO(D) are equivalent to first order sentences: indeed, it is easy to see that the FO(D) sentence ∀x(¬Rx ∨ (Rx ∧ Dx)) characterizes precisely the class D, which is not first order definable by assumption. A more interesting case is the one in which D -understood as a class of models -is first order definable: Definition 2.14 (First Order Dependencies). A k-ary dependency D is first order if there exists some sentence φ(R) in the signature {R}, where R is k-ary,
Proposition 2.15. Constancy atoms, functional dependence atoms, independence atoms and inclusion atoms are all first order.
Proof. Choose for φ(R) the expressions ∀xx
The following properties, well studied in the literature, provide a useful starting point for the classification of dependencies: 
• D is upwards closed if for all relations R over some domain
• D is union closed if for all families {R i : i ∈ I} of relations of the same arity over the same domain M such that M, R i ∈ D for all i ∈ I we have that M, i R i ∈ D as well.
Aside from upwards closure, these properties are preserved by Team Semantics in the following sense: Proof. Straightforward induction.
Closure properties such as these are useful to establish nondefinability relations between dependencies. Definition 2.18 (Definability of Dependencies). Let D be a family of dependencies and let E be another dependency. Then E is said to be definable in FO(D) if for all tuples t of terms there exists some formula φ(t) such that M |= X Et if and only if M |= X φ(t).
10
It is easy to verify that the dependencies discussed thus far all have the empty team property; that none of them is upwards closed; that constancy and functional dependency are downwards closed but not union closed; that inclusion is union closed but not downwards closed; and that independence is neither union closed nor downwards closed. By Proposition 2.17, this allows us to infer at once for example that neither inclusion nor functional dependence are definable in terms of the other, and that neither of them alone suffices to define independence.
11
It follows from known results in the literature that functional dependence atoms, inclusion atoms and independence atoms are "maximal" among the corresponding classes of first order dependencies. More precisely, for all first order dependencies D, In fact, the results concerning functional dependence atoms and independence atoms are stronger, in that they also hold for existential second order (rather than first order) dependencies D.
12 This is not, however, the case for Inclusion Logic: while all first order union-closed dependencies with the empty team property are definable in it, as discussed in [19] it is possible to find existential second order union-closed dependencies with the empty team property which are not definable in Inclusion Logic.
We conclude this section by providing a few definitions and elementary results that will be used in this work.
Definition 2.19 (∃v and ∀v).
Let v = v 1 . . . v k be a tuple of pairwise distinct variables. Then, for all formulas φ, we write ∃vφ as a shorthand for ∃v 1 ∃v 2 . . . ∃v n φ, and we write ∀vφ as a shorthand for ∀v 1 ∀v 2 . . . ∀v n φ. 
Proof. Trivial induction on the length k of the tuple v.
Definition 2.21 (Selective Implication). For all families of dependencies D, all formulas φ ∈ FO(D) and all first order formulas θ ∈ FO, we write θ ֒→ φ as a shorthand for (¬θ) ∨ (θ ∧ φ) where ¬θ is the first order negation normal form expression equivalent to the negation of θ.
Proposition 2.22. For all models M, all teams X, all families of dependencies D, all formulas φ ∈ FO(D) and all formulas θ ∈ FO,
Proof. Follows easily from Proposition 2.7 and from the rule for disjunction in Team Semantics.
where z 1 and z 2 are two new variables not occurring in φ or ψ and =(z i ) is the constancy atom of Definition 2.10, which holds in a team X if and only if z i takes at most one value in it.
Proposition 2.24. For all models M, all families of dependencies with the empty team property D, all formulas φ, ψ ∈ FO(D) and all teams X,
Proof. Straightforward from definitions (observe, however, that the requirement that all D ∈ D have the empty team property cannot be removed).
Proposition 2.25 (Positive Occurrences of Relations).
Let D be any family of dependencies and let φ be any formula of FO(D) in which some relation symbol R occurs only positively. 13 Then φ is upwards closed in R, in the sense that
for all suitable models M, teams X and relations Q.
Proof. Trivial by structural induction.
Strongly First Order and Safe Dependencies
As already mentioned, in [13] it was shown that the constancy atoms of Definition 2.10 do not increase the expressive power of First Order Logic with respect to sentences, in the sense that every sentence of the logic FO(= (·)) obtained by adding these atoms to First Order Logic is equivalent to some first order sentence. In other words, First Order Logic is not a natural "stopping point" in the family of the logics based on Team Semantics, as it is possible to find expressions (e.g. constancy atoms) that as per Proposition 2.9 cannot be defined in terms of it but however do not add to the expressive power of its sentences. Thus, we say that constancy atoms are strongly first order according to the following definition: A single dependency D is said to be strongly first order if the singleton {D} is strongly first order in the above sense.
Constancy atoms are not the only strongly first order dependencies, and the logic FO(=(·)) is not a natural "stopping point" in the above sense 14 either. This follows at once from the following result from [15] : Theorem 2.27. Let D ↑ be the family of all first order upwards closed dependencies. Then the family D ↑ ∪ {=(·)}, which contains all those dependencies and also constancy atoms, is strongly first order.
Using this result, it is not difficult to find additional strongly first order dependencies. For instance, as mentioned in [15] , the contradictory negations of inclusion dependencies
are all strongly first order, since they are definable (in the sense of Definition 2.18) in terms of constancy atoms and upwards closed dependencies. To the knowledge of the author all strongly first order dependencies known so far are also definable in terms of FO(D ↑ , =(·)). 15 This justifies the following As already mentioned, the main result of this work will be the proof of a special case of this conjecture.
In the recent [17] , the notion of strong first orderness was generalized to the following notion of safety: Definition 2.28 (Safe Dependencies and Families). Let L be a logic based on Team Semantics 16 and let E be a family of dependencies. Then E is safe for L if every sentence of L(E) is equivalent to some sentence of L.
A single dependency E is said to be safe for L if the singleton {E} is safe for L in the above sense.
A dependency E or a dependency family E is said to be safe for a dependency D or for a dependency family D if it is safe for the logic FO(D) (resp. FO(D)).
By definition, a dependency (or family of dependencies) is strongly first order if and only if it is safe for FO. The notion of safety can be used to make precise the informal concept of "natural stopping point" mentioned above:
Thus, Corollary 2.9 and the fact that constancy is strongly first order imply at once that First Order Logic is not definitionally closed, while Conjecture 1 would have as a direct consequence that FO(D ↑ , =(·)) is definitionally closed (and is, in fact, the only "definitional closure" of FO). More in general, a full characterization of the definitionally closed extensions of First Order Logic would be a very valuable contribution to the classification of logics based on Team Semantics.
Safety, however, is a delicate property: in particular, as shown in [17] , constancy dependencies are not safe for FO(⊆ 1 ), where ⊆ 1 is the family of only unary inclusion dependencies 17 , despite being as already mentioned strongly first order (that is, safe for FO). Thus, a dependency D may be safe for a logic L but unsafe for some other logic L ′ which strictly contains L. This suggests that the problem of fully characterizing safety relations and definitionally closed logics will not be of easy solution.
Nonetheless, studying the properties of safety is a fruitful endeavour. In particular, in this work we will prove that strongly first order dependencies are safe for FO(D) whenever D contains only downwards closed dependencies, and use this result to prove -as already mentioned -a special case of Conjecture 1.
Relativizable Dependencies
Sometimes it may be necessary to check whether a dependency holds not with respect to the current model, but with respect to some submodel thereof. This justifies the following definitions: Definition 2.30 (Relativized Dependencies). Let P be any unary relation symbol and let D(R) be any dependency. In particular, it follows from the above definitions that if D is relativizable and strongly first order then every sentence constructed out of relativized dependency atoms D P t and first order connectives and literals is equivalent to some first order sentence.
All the dependency atoms widely studied in the literature -functional dependence, inclusion, independence and so on -are relativizable. This can be verified by observing that they have the following, stronger property:
This notion is related to the closed-world assumption employed in database theory and knowledge representation: in short, if D is closed-world the validity of some atom Dv in a team X cannot be affected by the existence (or nonexistence) in the model of elements that do not appear as possible values of v in X.
It is easy to see that the dependencies examined so far are all closed-world. A first order, unary dependency notion that is not closed-world is non-totality nt = { M, P : P = M }, corresponding to the atoms M |= X nt(t) ⇔ X(t) = M . Indeed, if M, P ∈ nt and we restrict M to the set M ′ of the elements which occur in P then (M ′ , P ) ∈ nt. However, non-totality is definable in terms of constancy, which is closed-world:
Furthermore, despite not being closed-world, non-totality is still relativizable: indeed, it is straightforward to check that nt P (t) is logically equivalent to P t ∧ ∀x((x = t ∨ ¬P x) ֒→ nt(x)). Proof. If D is closed world and all elements that appear in X(v) are in P ,
is the set of all values that variables in v take in X. Thus, D P v is definable in FO(D) simply as vi∈v P v i ∧ Dv, and hence D is relativizable.
As we saw, it is easy to find dependencies which are not closed-world, like non-totality. At the moment, however, the author does not know of any dependency which is not relativizable, which justifies the following Open Problem: Find a dependency D which is not relativizable, or prove that all dependencies are relativizable.
3 Strongly first order dependencies are safe for downwards closed dependencies
As already mentioned, constancy dependencies are strongly first order -that is, safe for FO -but they are not safe for unary inclusion dependencies. However, in this section, we will see that strongly first order dependencies are safe for downwards closed dependencies. Let us begin by recalling an easy variant of Lyndon's Theorem:
Proposition 3.1. Let θ(S 1 . . . S n ) be a first order sentence in a signature containing the symbols S 1 . . . S n (and possibly others) which is upwards closed in all S i , in the sense that, for any model
Proof. Recall (see e.g. Theorem 8.3.3 of [25] ) that if θ is not equivalent to any formula in which the S i occur only positively 19 then it is not preserved under bijective homomorphisms that fix all relations other than S 1 . . . S n : therefore, there exist two models A and B such that A |= φ, B |= φ, and there is a bijective homomorphism h : A → B that fixes all relations other than S 1 . . . S n . For all i = 1 . . . n, let T i = h[S The main idea of this section will be to "extract" the downwards closed dependency atoms Dt (D ∈ D) from a sentence φ ∈ FO(D, S), leaving only a sentence of FO(S); then use the fact that S is strongly first order to find an equivalent first order sentence; and finally add back the dependencies previously removed.
The following lemmas show how to do the first step of this procedure: Proof. By structural induction on φ:
• If φ is of the form D 0 t then φ * (S) is simply St. Suppose that M |= X D 0 t; then for S = X(t) we have that M, S ∈ D 0 and M |= X St, as required. Conversely, suppose that such a S exists. Then since M |= X St we have that X(t) ⊆ S; but then, since D 0 is downwards closed and M, S ∈ D 0 we have that M, X(t) ∈ D 0 as well, and hence M |= X D 0 t as required.
• If φ is of the form ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 then -assuming without loss of generality that the instance of D 0 which we are replacing is in • If φ is of the form ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 then -assuming without loss of generality that the instance of D 0 which we are replacing is in
there is some S such that M, S ∈ D 0 , M |= X ψ * 1 (S) and M |= X ψ 2 iff there is some S such that M, S ∈ D 0 and M |= X φ * (S).
• If φ is of the form ∃vψ then φ * (S) is ∃vψ * (S). Then M |= X φ iff there exists some H such that M |= X[H/v] ψ iff there exist some S and H such that M, S ∈ D 0 and M |= X[H/v] ψ * (S) iff there exists some S such that M, S ∈ D 0 and M |= φ * (S).
• If φ is of the form ∀vψ then φ * (S) is ∀vψ 
Moreover, all S i occur only positively in χ.
Proof. Starting from φ, we can apply iteratively the previous lemma to remove all instances of dependencies D ∈ D from φ. In this way, we obtain a sentence θ(S 1 . . . S n ) in FO(S) which -aside from being in FO(S) rather than in FOwould satisfy our requirements. But since S is a strongly first order family of dependencies, θ(S 1 . . . S n ) is logically equivalent to some first order χ(S 1 . . . S n ). Furthermore, since the S i occur only positively in θ by Proposition 2.25 it is the case that θ is upwards closed in all S i , and hence so is χ, and hence -by Proposition 3.1 -we can also require that all S i occur only positively in χ.
Note that there is no guarantee that the first order sentence χ(S 1 . . . S n ) obtained via Lemma 3.3 would contain only one occurrence of each symbol S i , as the translation from FO(S) to FO may introduce additional occurrences. However, as we will now see, as long as the S i occur only positively this can be dealt with:
Lemma 3.4. Let D be a downwards closed dependency, let χ(S) be a first order formula where S is a relational symbol that occurs only positively in χ, and let χ ′ (W 1 . . . W n ) be the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of S in χ with a different new symbol W i . Then the following are equivalent for all suitable models M and assignments s:
1. There exists some S such that M, S ∈ D and M |= χ(S);
Proof. 
. S), that is, M |= χ(S).
In this way, we managed to "bring out" all the dependencies of D and convert the remaining expression to First Order Logic. Now we need to show that it is possible to "put them back in".
To do so, we will have to encode multiple relations into a single team. The obvious way to do so would be to fix tuples of variables v 1 . . . v n and let a team X correspond to the sets of tuples X(v i ) = {s(v i ) : s ∈ X} for i = 1 . . . n; but a problem with this is that, as long as the team X is nonempty, it would not be possible to encode empty sets of tuples. So we will instead use two tuples of variables 20 v i and w i to encode the relation Figure 2 for an illustration.
Using this representation, it is first of all possible to state that the union of the sets of tuples of elements encoded by certain variables satisfy a certain dependency:
Lemma 3.5. Let D be any dependency, let k be its arity, let v 1 . . . v n , w 1 . . . w n be tuples of variables of length equal to the arity of D, and let Then for all suitable models M (with at least two elements) and teams X,
Proof. Suppose that M |= X D ∪ (v 1 . . . v n ; w 1 . . . w n ). Then there exist some H and some
Now, Y is precisely the set of all tuples in X[M/p 1 . . . p n q][H/z 0 z 1 ] such that the value of q is equal to the value of some p i . Therefore, the first condition implies
and then the second condition implies that M,
Then let 0 and 1 be two distinct elements in M , let 0 and 1 represent tuples of k zeroes or ones, and let H : X[M/p 1 . . . p n q] → P(M 2k )\{∅} be defined as
, because for each s ∈ X and for each i = 1 . . . n there exists an assignment Finally, we need a way to "put back" the dependencies of D into the formula. The next two lemmas take care of that: Lemma 3.6. Let ψ(W ) be a quantifier-free FO(D) formula in which the k-ary relation symbol W occurs at most once and only positively and let ψ ′ (v, w) be the formula obtained by replacing the (unique) occurrence W t of W in ψ with v = w ∧ t = w, where v and w are tuples of new variables of length equal to the arity of W . Then, for all suitable models M, relations W and teams X, M |= X ψ(W ) if and only if there exists some H such that
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on ψ.
• If ψ is of the form W t, ψ ′ is simply v = w ∧ t = w. Now if M |= X W t it must be that s(t) ∈ W for all s ∈ X. Thus, if we define H so that H(s) = {s(t)s(t)} for all s ∈ X we have at once that X[H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) = {s(t) : s ∈ X} ⊆ W , and furthermore M |= X[H/vw] v = w ∧ t = w as required.
Conversely, suppose that there exists some H such that X[H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆ W for all s ∈ X and M |= X[H/vw] v = w ∧ t = w. Now, for all s ∈ X, let m = s(t): then s[mm/vw] ∈ X[H/vw], and therefore m ∈ W . Thus M |= X W t as required.
• If ψ(W ) is of the form ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 , let us assume -without loss of generalitythat W occurs only in
So by induction hypothesis we know that there exists some H :
Now let m 1 and m 2 be two arbitrary, distinct tuples of elements, and let H ′ : X → P(M 2k )\{∅} be defined as
Then by construction H ′ (s) = ∅ for all s ∈ Y , and furthermore
Then by induction hypothesis we have that M |= Y ψ 1 (W ). Now let Z = {s ∈ X :
By locality, we have that M |= Z ψ 2 , and moreover X = Y ∪ Z (since if s ∈ X then there are some
• If ψ(W ) is of the form ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , let us again assume that W occurs only in v, w) . Furthermore, by locality, we have that M |= X[H/vw] ψ 2 , and therefore
Then by locality M |= X ψ 2 and by induction hypothesis M |= X ψ 1 (W ), and hence M |= X ψ 1 (W ) ∧ ψ 2 as required.
sentence in Quantifier Normal Form in which the W i -which all have the same arity k -occur only positively and at most once each, and let D be a downwards closed dependency of the same arity of the W i . Then the following are equivalent: 
. Applying repeatedly Lemma 3.6, we can find
and hence that 2. holds.
Conversely, suppose that 2. holds. Then there exist functions
Then by Lemma 3.5 we have that M, i W i ∈ D; and furthermore, by Lemma 3.6 M |= Y ψ(W 1 . . . W n ). But then by locality M |= X ψ(W 1 . . . W n ), and hence M |= χ(W 1 . . . W n ) and 1. holds.
We can now finally prove the main result of this section: Theorem 3.8. Let D be any family of downwards closed dependencies and let S be any strongly first order family of dependencies. Then S is safe for D.
Proof. Let φ be a sentence of FO(S, D) . Then, by Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, there exist a first order formula θ(W 
But applying repeatedly Lemma 3.7 and the fact that all D j(i) are downwards closed 21 we can see that there exists some FO(D) sentence
which is true if and only if B) above holds. Thus, every FO(S, D) sentence is equivalent to some FO(D) sentence -in other words, S is safe for D.
4 Characterizing strongly first order, relativizable, downwards closed dependencies
We can now prove that all dependencies that are nontrivial, relativizable, downwards closed and strongly first order are definable in terms of constancy. To do so, we will need to use the Chang-Makkai Theorem, applying it not to unary relations (as is presented e.g. in Theorem 5.3.6 of [5] ) but to k-ary relations (as mentioned in [4] , the proof carries over to this case without problems. For reference, the Appendix contains the detailed proof of the case that interests us).
On the other hand, it suffices to consider countable structures and vocabularies containing only a relation symbol R. So this is the variant of the Chang-Makkai Theorem that we need:
Theorem 4.1. Let Φ(R) be a first order sentence on the vocabulary {R}, where R is k-ary. The following are equivalent:
1. For every countable model M over the signature {R}, |{R :
2. There are a finite number of formulas θ 1 (x, z) . . . θ n (x, z), over the empty vocabulary, such that
The idea of this section's main proof is to show that if D is strongly first order then the property D max of being maximal among the R that satisfy D is also strongly first order; that whenever M, R ∈ D there is at least one R ′ ⊇ R such that M, R ′ ∈ D max ; and that for every countable model there must be a countable number of such maximal R ′ . Then we use the above version of the Chang-Makkai Theorem to show that these maximal sets are definable over the empty signature, and use the downwards closure property to define the D atoms via Boolean disjunctions (that is, unraveling Definition 2.23, via constancy atoms). is equivalent to some first order sentence. Observe that M |= φ(R) if and only if there exists some S such that R S and M, S ∈ D. Indeed, suppose that such a S exists and let a ∈ S\R. Then, choosing a as the only value for x, 22 we have that M |= {(x:a)} ¬Rx. Now let X = {(x : a)}[M/y], and split it into Z = {s ∈ X : s(y) ∈ S} and Y = X\Z = {s ∈ X : s(y) ∈ S}. Clearly M |= Z Dy, because Z(y) = S. Moreover, for all s ∈ Y we have that s(y) ∈ R, because s(y) ∈ S and R ⊆ S, and that s(y) = s(x), because s(x) = a ∈ S. Thus we have that M |= Y ¬Ry ∧ x = y, as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |= {ǫ} φ(R), where ǫ is the empty assignment. Then there exists some
Furthermore, R is contained in S: indeed, for all m ∈ R there is some s ∈ X is such that s(y) = m, and then s ∈ Z, because M |= Y ¬Ry and X = Y ∪ Z. Finally, S is not contained in R: indeed, if a is a possible value for x in X then a ∈ R and a ∈ S (because the assignment (xy : aa) is in X but not in Y ).
If φ(R) is equivalent to a first order sentence, the same is true of its negation. Let ψ(R) be the first order sentence equivalent to the negation of φ(R): then M |= ψ(R) if and only if there is no S R such that M, S ∈ D. Thus D max (R) is equivalent to D(R)∧ψ(R), and therefore it is first order. It remains to show that it is strongly first order as a dependency. Now ψ(R) is upwards closed in R: indeed, if there is no S R such that D(S) and R ⊆ R ′ then clearly there is no S R ′ such that D(S) either. By Theorem 2.27, upwards closed dependencies are strongly first order; therefore, the dependency E(R) = { M, R : M, R |= ψ(R)} is strongly first order.
But by Theorem 3.8, strongly first order dependencies are safe for downwards closed dependencies. So in particular E is safe for D, and the atom D max (t) is definable in FO(D, E) as D max (t) := Dt ∧ Et. Therefore every sentence φ ∈ FO(D max ) is equivalent to some sentence φ ′ ∈ FO(D, E), which by the safety of E for D is equivalent to some sentence φ ′′ ∈ FO(D), which by the strongly first orderness of D is equivalent to some first order sentence. Therefore D max is strongly first order, as required.
The following consequence of the above proposition will also be necessary for our proof: By construction, this is true if and only if there exists a relation R which satisfies D(R) but is contained in no maximal superset; and since strongly first order dependencies are safe for downwards closed dependencies by Theorem 3.8, this is equivalent to some FO(D) sentence and thus -since D is strongly first order itself -to some first order sentence. Therefore, there exists a first order sentence η over the empty vocabulary such that M |= η if and only if there is some relation R with domain M which satisfies D(R) but which is not contained in any R ′ satisfying D max (R). This is clearly not true if the model M is finite, so for all finite models M we have that M |= ¬η. But then, since ¬η is a first order sentence over the empty signature, by compactness the same is true for all models, finite or infinite.
By the semantics of η this implies that whenever M, R ∈ D there exists some R ′ ⊇ R such that M, R ′ ∈ D max , as required.
As a quick aside, it is perhaps worth briefly pointing out here that this corollary fails for arbitrary first order dependencies: if M, R ∈ D, it is not necessarily the case that there exists some maximal R ′ ⊇ R such that M, R ′ ∈ D. As a counterexample, let D be the 4-ary relation which is defined by the conjunction of the following axioms:
• If we write "x ≤ y" for ∃zuRxyzu, the relation ≤ is a linear order with endpoints;
• If we write "Bz" for ∃xyuRxyzu, B is not true of the starting point of the linear order, it is true of some element, and whenever it is true of some element it is true of its immediate predecessor along ≤ (if any exists);
• If we write "T u" for ∃xyzRxyzu, there exists some element a such that 
T
Then it is easy to check that M, X(t) ∈ D, but no maximal R ′ ⊇ X(t) satisfying D exists: the range of T (that is, the projection of the relation over the third element) can be extended to any set of the form {n ∈ N : n ≤ m} for any m ∈ N but not to N or to N ∪ {∞}, while nothing can be added to the linear order ≤ (that is, to the projection over the first two elements) or to B (that is, to the projection over the fourth element) without violating our axioms.
The fact that whenever M |= X Dt there exists some maximal X ′ ⊇ X such that M |= X ′ Dt, therefore, is one that does not hold for all dependencies (although it is easy to check that it holds for functional dependence, independence and inclusion, and although we just proved that it holds for all downwards closed strongly first order dependencies). Proof. Suppose that there exist uncountably many such R. Then let I be a (k + 1)-ary relation symbol, let P be a unary symbol, and consider the first order theory T containing the following axioms:
(that is, from the relativization of D max (R) to P ) by replacing every Rv with Ivq; (d) ¬χ(I, P ), where χ(I, P ) is the first order sentence equivalent 23 to the FO(D P ) sentence ∀q∃z(¬Izq ∧ D P z).
I state that if our assumption is true, the above theory -that is first order and has a finite vocabulary -has only uncountable models. This is clearly impossible by the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and therefore our assumption cannot hold. Indeed, suppose that M = M, P, I is a countable model of T . Then by (a) P is infinite and countable, and we can assume that it is A up to isomorphism; by (b) and (c), for all values m ∈ M the relation I m = {a ∈ P k : a, m ∈ I} enumerates subsets of P k which satisfy D P max in M , that is to say which satisfy D max in P ; and by (d), as we will see, that enumeration contains all those subsets. But we said that A -and, therefore, P -contains uncountably many distinct R which satisfy D max (R) in it, and therefore this is impossible.
On the other hand -again, postponing the verification that (d) holds if and only if I enumerates all subsets of P which satisfy D max (R) in P -there certainly exists an uncountable model M = M, P, I of the above theory: let M be a set of cardinality 2 ℵ0 containing A, let the interpretation of P be A itself, and let I m range over all (uncountably many, but certainly no more than |M | = 2 |A| ) R ⊆ P k such that P, R ∈ D max as m ranges over M . Thus our theory has an uncountable model but no countable models, which is impossible. • Left to right: Suppose that M |= ξ. Then there exists a team X = {ǫ}[M/q][H/z], for some function H, such that M |= X ¬Izq ∧ D P z. Now let R = X(z). From the second conjunct, we have at once that R ⊆ P k 23 Such a first order sentence exists because D is strongly first order and relativizable. Note that we do not need Dmax to be relativizable -for (c) we only need that D P max (R) is a first order sentence, which is certainly true since Dmax(R) is a first order sentence -but just that D is relativizable.
and that P, R ∈ D; and for every q ∈ M there exists some assignment s ∈ X for which s(q) = m, and thus from the first conjunct we have that s(z), m ∈ I, that is s(z) ∈ I m. Thus, P, R ∈ D but R is not contained in any I m; and since by Corollary 4.3 this R must be contained in some relation that satisfies D max in P , it follows that I m does not enumerate all maximal relations.
• Right to left: Suppose that I m does not enumerate all subsets of P k which satisfy D max in P for m ranging in M . Then in particular there exists some R ⊆ P k such that P, R ∈ D max and R\I m = ∅ for all m ∈ M . Now consider the following function H : {ǫ}[M/q] → P(M k )\{∅}:
As we just saw,
we clearly have that M |= X ¬Izq. Furthermore, M |= X D P z: indeed, X(z) ⊆ R by construction, P, R ∈ D since P, R ∈ D max , thus P, X(z) ∈ D by downwards closure and finally M |= X D P z. Therefore M |= ξ as required.
At this point, our conclusion follows easily from the Chang-Makkai Theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Let D(R) be a downwards closed, strongly first order, relativizable dependency that has the empty team property (that is, it is satisfied by the empty team) 24 . Then it is definable in FO(=(·)).
Proof. By Proposition 4.4, |{R : R ⊆ M k , M, R ∈ D max }| is countable for all countable models M. Thus, by Theorem 4.1, there exist a finite number of first order formulas θ 1 (x, z) . . . θ n (x, z) over the empty vocabulary (and in which we can assume -via variable renaming -that the variables of xz are not being quantified over), such that
For each i, let χ i (z) := D(θ i ( , z)) be the first order formula obtained from D(R) by replacing every occurrence Rt of R with θ i (t, z), so that M |= (z:m) χ i (z) if and only if M, R ∈ D for R = {a : M |= θ i (a, m))}.
Then I state that Dv is equivalent to the FO(=(·), ⊔) formula
Where ⊔ represents the Boolean disjunction of Definition 2.23, which is definable in terms of constancy atoms.
Indeed, suppose that M |= X Dv. Then for R = X(v) we have that M, R ∈ D, and thus by Corollary 4.3 there exists some R ′ ⊇ R such that M, R ′ ∈ D max . Thus, there exists some i = 1 . . . n and a fixed tuple m of From the first statement, we obtain at once that the set R ′ = {a : M |= θ i (a, m)} is such that M, R ′ ∈ D. From the second one, we obtain that R = X(v) is contained in R ′ . By the downwards closure of D we can then conclude that M, R ∈ D, that is M |= X Dv.
Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper, a characterization of downwards closed, relativizable, strongly first order dependencies was found by showing that -aside from the trivially false one -these are precisely the ones that are definable in terms of constancy atoms. This is a special case of Conjecture 1, according to which all strongly first order dependencies are definable in terms of constancy atoms and upwards closed dependencies; and it is the hope of the author that the techniques developed in this work may be adapted to generalize this result, ideally all the way to a full proof of Conjecture 1.
A reasonable enough starting point could be to attempt to get rid, or alternatively prove the necessity of, the requirement of relativizability, for instance by showing that all first order dependencies (or at least all downwards closed ones) are relativizable anyway.
Another possible direction in which the present work can be expanded could be to consider not only logics FO(D) obtained by adding dependency atoms to First Order Logic, but more in general logics L(D) where L can be based on arbitrary choices of connectives and operators (interpreted in Team Semantics). Much like studying the more general notion of safety gave us in this work the tools necessary to prove the above mentioned result about strongly first order dependencies, it is possible that studying the notions of safety and strong first orderness in the more general L(D) case may give us the tools for solving the FO(D) one; and, moreover, such an investigation would connect the research program to which this work belongs to the related area of the study of generalized quantifiers in Team Semantics [10, 33, 11, 2] .
2. There are a finite number of formulas θ 1 (x, z) . . . θ n (x, z), over the empty vocabulary, such that φ(R) |= i ∃z∀x(Rx ↔ θ i (x, z)).
The direction from 2. to 1. is obvious. For the direction from 1. to 2., we reason as follows. Suppose that 2. fails. Then the theory {φ(R)} ∪ {∀z¬∀x(Rx ↔ θ(x, z)) : θ(x, z) ∈ FO},
where z ranges over all tuples of all lengths and θ(x, z) ranges over all first order formulas over the empty signature, is satisfiable. Let M = M, R be a countable, recursively saturated model for it. Let k be the arity of R, and let (t(i) : i ∈ N) be an enumeration of all k-tuples of elements in M . We will show that there exist 2 ℵ0 distinct R ′ ⊆ M k such that M, R ′ is isomorphic to M, R ; and since M |= φ(R), this in particular will show that 1. fails.
The idea of the proof is to define two functions G and H, sending -for every n ∈ N -every function f : {0 . . . n − 1} → {0, 1} into some G(f ), H(f ) ∈ {0 . . . n − 1} → M k such that Before proving that these G, H exist, let us verify that their existence would lead to the required conclusion of there being uncountably many R ′ isomorphic
• n is of the form 3m + 1:
In this case, we extend H as H(f ∪ { n, 0 }) = H(f ∪ { n, 1 }) = H(f ) ∪ { n, t(m) }, and we must show that there exists some tuple t ′ ∈ M k such that M, G(f ), t ′ ≡ M, H(f ), t(m)
Again, this follows easily from countable homogeneity (or, more simply, from the fact that M has no relation symbols in the signature).
Then extend G by setting G(f ∪ { n, 0 }) = G(f ∪ { n, 1 }) = G(f ) ∪ { n, t ′ }: the conditions about F and G are still satisfied.
• n is of the form 3m + 2:
We need to find tuples b 0 ∈ R, b 1 ∈ R, c such that where, in the above expression, θ ranges over all first order formulas (over the empty signature) with parameters in G(f ). The above expression must be finitely unsatisfiable in M, R ; otherwise, by the recursive saturation of (M, R), we would have that a b 1 exists as required. So, for each b 0 ∈ R there exists a σ b0 (x) such that M |= σ b0 (b 0 ) and M |= ∀x(σ b0 (x) → Rx). 29 Then consider the theory {Rx} ∪ {∀y(σ(y) → Ry) → ¬σ(x) : σ(x) ∈ FO} where, again, σ(x) ranges over all first order formulas over the empty signature with parameters in G(f ). This must also be finitely unsatisfiable given the theory of M , since otherwise by recursive saturation there would exist some b ∈ R such that for no formula σ we have M |= ∀y(σ(y) → Ry) and M |= σ(b), and we just saw that σ b is such a formula.
Therefore, there exists some finite number of σs, which we can write as σ 1 (x, a) . . . σ q (x, a) for some tuple a of parameters in G(f ), such that M |= 
